Within-and between-nations differences in norms for experiencing emotions were analyzed in a cross-cultural study with 1,846 respondents from 2 individualistic (United States, Australia) and 2 collectivistic (China, Taiwan) countries. A multigroup latent class analysis revealed that there were both universal and culture-specific types of norms for experiencing emotions. Moreover, strong intranational variability in norms for affect could be detected, particularly for collectivistic nations. Unexpectedly, individualistic nations were most uniform in norms, particularly with regard to pleasant affect. Individualistic and collectivistic nations differed most strongly in norms for self-reflective emotions (e.g., pride and guilt). Norms for emotions were related to emotional experiences within nations. Furthermore, there were strong national differences in reported emotional experiences, even when norms were held constant.
The cross-cultural perspective has a long tradition in research on emotions. More than 100 years ago, Charles Darwin (1872 Darwin ( /1970 based the theoretical considerations in his book The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals to a large degree on reports he had received from people living in different cultures of the world. Since that time, cross-cultural comparisons have become the most important ethological research strategy for proving the assumption that there are universal, biologically determined programs, particularly for the expression of emotions. Reviewing the results of this ethological research paradigm, Grammer and Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1993) came to the conclusion that there is a universal human system not only for producing emotions but also for understanding the expression of emotions.
From the perspective of cross-cultural anthropology and psychology, however, the biological perspective is not sufficient for a full understanding of the experience and expression of emotions and must be complemented by consideration of the cultural context in which emotions are experienced, expressed, and perceived (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto, 1996; Mesquita & Ellsworth, 2001; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Scherer, 1994 Scherer, , 1997 Scherer & Wallbott, 1994; Scherer, Wallbott, & Summerfield, 1986; Shaver, Wu, & Schwartz, 1992; Wallbott & Scherer, 1988 ). If we follow Triandis's (1997) definiMichael Eid, Institute for Psychology, University of Magdeburg, Magdeburg, Germany; Ed Diener, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Michael Eid, who is now at Faehbereich Psychologie, Universitat Koblenz-Landau, Im Fort 7, 76289 Landau, Germany. Electronic mail may be sent to eid@uni-landau. de. tion of a cultural syndrome as a "shared set of beliefs, attitudes, norms, values, and behavior organized around a central theme and found among speakers of one language, in one time period, and in one geographic region" (p. 443), it is necessary to identify cultural syndromes that are related to the experience, expression, regulation, and socialization of emotions.
According to Frijda and Mesquita (1995) , cultural influences on the emotion process are mediated to a large extent by the significance an emotion has for an individual. Frijda and Mesquita distinguished among three aspects of emotion that are culturally influenced. First, they considered social consequences of emotions that regulate the expression and suppression of emotions. Second, they stressed the importance of norms for experiencing different emotions. Third, they discussed social-cohesive functions of emotions. Several ethnographic studies have shown that there are strong cultural differences in the social consequences of emotions, particularly in how the expression of emotions is valued. The expression of anger, for example, is strongly disapproved of by the Utku Eskimos (Briggs, 1970) , whereas the Kaluli are expected and even encouraged to show their anger (Schieffelin, 1983 ; for further examples, see Mesquita & Frijda, 1992) .
There are strong cultural differences in display rules (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Izard, 1980) that are learned during the socialization process (Saarni, 1999) . There are also cultural differences in the norms for experiencing different emotions. Hochschild (1983) , for example, discussed the role of feeling rules, social norms that prescribe how people should feel in specific situations (e.g., on a wedding day, at a funeral). In addition to situational feeling rules, norms for the experience of emotions can also be present in a society in the form of generalized expectations. This means that emotions can differ in their desirability and perceived appropri- EDO AND DIENER ateness across situations. The emotional climate of nations can be characterized by generalized norms for experiencing different emotions and the fact that these norms are subject to historical change (Stearns, 1994; Steams & Lewis, 1998) .
Most of the research on cultural differences in emotions has focused on the first aspect, the social consequences of emotion manifestations and how they regulate the expression versus suppression of emotions. Mesquita and Frijda (1992) , however, reviewed evidence that there are cultural similarities and differences in all components of the emotion process (i.e., antecedent events, event coding, appraisal, physiological reaction patterns, action readiness, emotional behavior, and regulation). In explaining cultural differences in these components, not only are the norms for the expression of emotions relevant but also the norms for the experience of emotions. For example, people who value positive emotions might be more alert to positive events, might seek situations that provoke positive emotions, might appraise positive events in a more positive way, might stay in positive situations longer, and might try to maintain their positive feelings or even enhance them. However, people who think that positive feelings are inappropriate are likely to avoid situations that cause positive feelings, might not be able to appraise positive situations in a positive way, might withdraw from positive situations much earlier, and might even try to dampen positive feelings. On the other hand, people who think that negative emotions (e.g., anger) are appropriate might seek anger-provoking situations when they assume that these situations would be helpful (e.g., for clarifying conflicts, for asserting their goals). These people might be more prone to appraise situations with respect to the situation's potential for hindering their goal, they might not withdraw from anger situations, and they might try to maintain their anger as long as they think this would be necessary for asserting their goals. However, people who believe that the experience of anger is inappropriate might avoid anger-provoking situations. They might not focus on components of a situation that hinder a personal goal when appraising a situation, and they might try to withdraw from an anger situation early and try to suppress or dampen their anger reaction. Hence, norms for the experience of emotions might have a strong influence on the regulation of one's emotions.
Moreover, values and norms for experiencing emotions might be important not only for an individual emotional episode but also for regulating emotions in other people. People who think that the experience of positive emotions (e.g., pride) is inappropriate are likely to disapprove of those emotional experiences in other people. This might be particularly important for the socialization process (Saarni, 1999) . Parents who think that specific emotions are inappropriate are likely to raise their children in such a way that the children learn to avoid specific emotional situations and emotional reactions, to develop a specific appraisal style, and to regulate their emotions in such a way that they maintain a "correct" emotional life. Parents who think that specific emotions are positive are likely to encourage their children to feel and express these emotions and to reward emotional behavior that is in line with their own emotional norms. Saarni (1999) pointed out that parents are expected to socialize their children to behave and feel according to normative beliefs about desirable and appropriate emotional behavior. There are several ethnographic studies that are in accord with these assumptions (for an overview, see Ulich & Mayring, 1992) . Finally, knowledge of norms for experiencing emotions might be very important for cross-cultural communication and the relationships of people in different cultures.
We owe much of our knowledge of cultural influences on emotions to ethnographic and anthropological studies. These studies have produced interesting insights into cultural specificities, but they are limited in several ways. First, they are single-case studies that focus on one culture that is described in detail. These studies do not discuss whether there are cross-cultural differences in emotional norms and how these cross-cultural differences are explained. Second, these studies often refer to small groups, and the generalizability of the results might be questionable. Third, they focus on aspects of emotion that are typical for a culture. How strong within-culture differences are compared with cross-cultural differences is not analyzed.
If we take a cross-cultural perspective, at least two questions are important: (a) Which cultures should differ in values and norms for experiencing emotions (according to theoretical models), and why? and (b) Can cross-cultural differences in values and norms be empirically confirmed (according to empirical studies)?
Values and Norms for Experiencing Emotions
Cultural differences in values and norms for experiencing emotions can be predicted from cultural differences in self-construals. In cross-cultural psychology, two prototypical self-construals, the independent and the interdependent self-construal, have been distinguished by several authors (e.g., Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989) . The independent self consists of a configuration of inner attributes (e.g., dispositions, motives, and values) that make an individual unique from others. In cultures where an independent self is predominant, people are expected to become independent from others and to pursue and assert individual goals. People with an individual self focus on their own attributes, abilities, and preferences and tend to express these attributes in public and in private. The personality pattern that characterizes the independent self is also named idiocentrism (Triandis, 1997) . Cultures in which idiocentrism is the predominant personality pattern are called individualistic cultures (Triandis, 1997) . Hence, people with an independent self are found in individualistic (e.g., Western) cultures more often than in collectivistic ones (e.g., Eastern cultures).
The interdependent (relational) self, on the other hand, is characterized by the belief that the self cannot be separated from others or from the social context. The self is part of all-embracing social relationships, and people with an interdependent self focus on and are regulated by the emotions, thoughts, and actions of other people. The personality pattern characterizing the interdependent self is also called allocentrism (Triandis, 1997) . In collectivistic cultures, in which this construal of the self is predominant, the social norm is to maintain harmony with others, to meet social obligations, and to support the goals of others who are in a social relationship with oneself. Thus, in contrast to individualistic cultures, the norm is not to become independent from others but to fulfill one's social duties. Lee, Aaker, and Gardner (2000) showed that differences in self-construals are accompanied by differences in regulatory focus (approach vs. avoidance). Lee et al. (2000) defined regulatory focus as "the extension of the basic hedonic principle of approach and avoidance to allow for distinct self-regulatory strategies and needs" (p. 1122). People with independent self-construals are promotion focused. They focus more strongly on information that is relevant for approaching their own aspirations and wishes. Moreover, they place more emphasis on positive than on negative information regarding themselves. People with an interdependent self, on the other hand, are more prevention focused. They place more attention on information that prevents them from violating social norms. Furthermore, they emphasize negative information regarding themselves.
Differences in self-construal and regulatory focus might be strongly related to norms for experiencing emotions. In particular, it can be expected that there are strong cultural differences in self-conscious or self-reflective emotions-emotions that reflect on the individual's own doing (Tangney & Fischer, 1995) and that are, therefore, important for self-regulation. Self-conscious emotions that indicate that personal goals have been successfully approached might be more important and desirable for people with independent self-construals, who are more promotion focused. Therefore, the self-conscious emotions that arise from succeeding by one's own efforts (e.g., pride) are highly valued in individualistic societies. However, self-conscious emotions that indicate that one's controllable actions are wrong or insufficient (negative information regarding oneself) might be more important and desirable for people with interdependent self-construals, who are more prevention focused. Consequently, the self-conscious emotions that are caused by violating social norms and by failing to fulfill social obligations (e.g., guilt) are likely to be more highly valued in collectivistic societies. Cross-cultural differences in norms for emotions might be less important for other emotions that are not self-conscious in nature and that arise more from external causes than from internal, controllable sources (e.g., anger, worry, joy).
There have been few empirical cross-cultural studies on norms for experiencing emotions. Most cross-cultural studies on emotions refer to cross-cultural differences in the frequency, intensity, or expression of emotions (see, e.g., Kitayama, Markus, & Matsumoto, 1995; Stipek, 1998; Stipek, Weiner, & Li, 1989) . These studies allow only indirect and, therefore, limited conclusions about how emotions are generally valued in these cultures. For example, people might think that positive emotions are very desirable. If they are not able to seek positive situations or to react to positive events with positive emotions, however, they will not feel positive emotions frequently or intensely. Thus, norms and feelings are distinct components of the emotion process, and, consequently, variables characterizing the feeling of emotions are only indirect indicators of norms and attitudes. In the following, the results of some previous studies on norms for affect are summarized. Stipek (1998) compared the value of pride between Chinese and Americans. She found that for the Chinese, pride is more acceptable for achievements that benefit others than for achievements that are due to personal accomplishments. Sommers (1984) explored the values of different emotions by asking six questions, but only with small samples. Sommers found that there were strong cross-cultural similarities with respect to the emotions of love, happiness, and joy, which were considered desirable in all cultures. Also, hate, terror, and rage were considered as dangerous and destructive in all cultures. Furthermore, guilt, frustration, fear, shame, and embarrassment were consistently considered aversive. Cross-cultural differences were shown with respect to specific emotions. The Americans valued enthusiasm very strongly, the Greeks highly valued respect, and the West Indians valued pride. The Chinese considered more negative emotions to be useful and constructive than did the three other nations.
Although they give valuable insights into the norms for emotions, previous studies are limited in two ways. First, they have often focused either on a limited number of emotions and nations or on small samples. Second, differences between cultures have typically been analyzed by comparing mean values (or other statistics) between the cultures without testing whether the assumption of measurement equivalence across cultures was fulfilled. Comparing means, for example, presumes that individuals use the scales in the same way (assumption of measurement invariance). This means that there are not individual response styles such as the preference for one response category (e.g., the middle one) or the avoidance of response categories (e.g., the extreme ones). If individual response styles are present, mean values can only be compared if the response styles are equally distributed in the different cultures. The absence of interindividual differences in response styles can be statistically tested in the framework of item response theory by demonstrating that the item parameters do not differ between individuals or subgroups of individuals (e.g., Drasgow & Kanfer, 1985) . The assumption that all individuals use the scales in the same way, however, can be questioned with regard to two issues: (a) Several analyses that have been undertaken during the past years have shown that this assumption is often not fulfilled even within individual cultures (e.g., Eid & Rauber, 2000; Rost, Carstensen, & von Davier, 1997) . (b) Moreover, as Leung and Bond (1989) pointed out, it is possible that different response styles exist between the varying cultures (see also Bond, 1996) . Consequently, the measurement invariance assumption must be tested within each culture as well as between different cultures to ensure that these mean differences are not of an artificial nature. Previous studies on norms for emotions, however, have not tested whether the assumption of measurement invariance holds. One aim of the present study is to test whether the same norm structure can be found in different cultures (the problem of structural equivalence in cross-cultural psychology; van de Vijver & Leung, 1996 .
In cross-cultural psychology, several methods have been applied to test the assumptions of measurement and structural equivalence (for an overview, see van de Vijver & Leung, 1996 . Most typically, these assumptions have been tested by dimensional models such as confirmatory factor analysis or latent trait models of item response theory. Dimensional models, however, are not appropriate for testing the measurement equivalence of norms for emotions in the present research context. Dimensional models assume that all individuals and items can be ordered on a continuum. This assumption is very strong if we consider norms for emotions. It is very reasonable that, within cultures, individuals differ in the types of emotions that they consider desirable and undesirable. For example, there might be people who think that anger is desirable but guilt is not, and there might be people for whom the opposite is true. These differences in norm patterns can be adequately assessed in a typological model. A typological model is also important from an emotion regulatory standpoint. Following Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, and Gramzow's (1992) research, for instance, it can be hypothesized that people who rate anger as an unacceptable emotion and guilt as an acceptable one tend to ascribe negative events to themselves, whereas for people with the opposite rating pattern, it is expected that they tend to blame other people for negative events. These individual profiles, however, are not visible if we compare means across cultures. A mean structure that, for example, implies that anger is not acceptable in a country yet guilt is acceptable does not indicate how uniform this difference is within cultures. Cross-cultural researchers have hitherto been frustrated by the fact that they want to examine cultural differences but recognize that very large variations also exist within cultures. To answer this challenge and interweave cultural and individual differences, we suggest the use of multigroup latent class analysis (e.g., Lazarsfeld & Henry, 1968; McCutcheon, 1987) . This type of analysis is able to address issues of scale equivalence as well as within-nation variability.
Latent class analysis is a procedure for categorical response variables and is based on four assumptions (e.g., Clogg, 1995; Eid, 2001; Langeheine & Rost, 1988) . It is first assumed that a population is not homogeneous; rather, it is composed of subpopulations. These subpopulations are called latent classes because they are not directly observable. Each individual in the population can and must belong to only one subpopulation; that is, the classes are disjunctive and exhaustive. The membership of a population is not known a priori, and only the membership probabilities (assignment probabilities) and the class sizes can be estimated. Second, all of the people belonging to the same class are homogeneous with respect to the class conditional response probabilities for the various categories of items. Third, the class structure holds for all items analyzed. Fourth, local stochastic independence is assumed. This means that the responses on items are independent, given latent class membership (hence, local independence). This assumption implies that the class structure explains all associations between the observable responses. In the framework of latent class analysis, measurement invariance exists when the response probabilities of the latent classes do not differ between the various cultures.
The typological combination of norms for different affects is theoretically more interesting than the simple comparison of mean values across cultures. Consequently, a typological approach that considers different rating patterns within a culture and between cultures is an appropriate starting point for the analysis of interand intracultural differences. If we compare typological structures across cultures, however, we have to ensure that the typological structures (measurement model) are identical in different cultures (measurement invariance). Thus, we need a typological model whose cross-cultural generalizability (measurement invariance) can be statistically tested. Multigroup latent class analysis is an appropriate model for testing typological structures between cultures. Compared with other methodological approaches that are traditionally applied in cross-cultural psychology, latent class analysis has a further strong methodological advantage. In methods traditionally applied in cross-cultural psychology, it is typically assumed that the parameters of a model (e.g., factor loadings) are the same for all individuals of a culture. This means that a culture has to be homogeneous and that heterogeneity is only allowed for individuals belonging to different cultures. If the assumption of measurement equivalence (e.g., assumption of equal factor loadings) across cultures must be rejected, this means that individuals from different cultures cannot be compared, for instance, with respect to a mean score. One strong advantage of latent class analysis is that the assumption of homogeneous cultures is not made. Moreover, there might be subgroups within one culture that differ with respect to the parameters of a model. These subgroups might exist in different cultures, but there might be subgroups that are so culture specific that they do not occur in other cultures. Thus, latent class analysis is able to detect universal types that exist in all cultures and culture-specific types that exist only in specific cultures. For example, there might be (universal) patterns of norms for emotions that can be found in all nations but also patterns of norms for emotions that are so specific that they can be found only in single nations. The assumption of measurement invariance would then hold only for the universal types (subgroups) that can be found in all cultures. Culture-specific classes, however, reveal structural differences between cultures and indicate individuals who are most typical for the uniqueness of a culture. For researchers interested in indigenous aspects of a culture, these people might be of major interest. The capability of latent class analysis to detect universal and culture-specific classes goes far beyond other statistical models for cross-cultural comparisons. Although multigroup latent class analysis appears to be perfectly suited for cross-cultural emotion psychology, as far as we know this type of analysis has not been used in this field until now (for other applications of multigroup latent class analysis in sociology and political sciences, see McCutcheon, 1998; McCutcheon & Hagenaars, 1997; McCutcheon & Nawojczyk, 1995) . In the following, we show how latent class analysis can be used to analyze and test cross-cultural differences in emotion norms in a much stronger way than is possible by comparing mean values.
In addition to this methodological aim, we pursue four more substantive aims. The first aim is to analyze whether explicitly measured norms differ between individualistic and collectivistic cultures in the way predicted by the cultural differences in selfconstruals and regulatory focus that we outlined earlier. Differences in the cultures should primarily be found for the selfevaluative emotion pride. Collectivistic countries should differ notably from individualistic countries in such a way that types (latent classes) that are characterized by the undesirability of pride occur more frequently. Concerning the negative emotions, types for which guilt is undesirable should be found more frequently in the individualistic nations (i.e., the United States and Australia) than in collectivistic ones. On the other hand, types with the opposite tendencies should be found more often in collectivistic countries.
Our second aim is to analyze whether norms for emotions are related to the frequency and intensity of emotions and whether these relations can be consistently found in different cultures. As we outlined above, there might be only a weak relation between norms and the experience of feelings, but this question has not been sufficiently explored with empirical data.
Our third aim is to scrutinize whether there are cross-cultural differences in the intensity and frequency of reported emotional experiences if we compare people who have the same norms but belong to different cultures. This is another as yet unexplored question. These analyses go beyond traditional studies, which compare the intensity and frequency of emotions between cultures without measuring norms. The intensity and frequency of emotions between cultures might be partly or totally due to differences in the norms for emotions. However, if we correct for differences in the norms, we can compare individuals who are homogeneous with respect to what emotions they consider desirable. If there are cross-cultural differences in the intensity and frequency of emotions between people who have the same norm, this might be more indicative of cross-cultural differences in regulation abilities, genetic differences, or life circumstances that influence emotional feelings.
Method

Participants
We analyzed four subsamples of a large study on emotions in 41 countries (Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998) . In the following, we refer to the subsamples of college students from the United States (N = 443), Australia (N = 292), Taiwan (N = 553), and the People's Republic of China (N = 558). We selected these four countries on the basis of the following criteria: First, the countries investigated should differ in their individualistic versus collectivistic orientation. According to Harry Triandis's judgments (personal communication, May 1, 1993) , the countries can be classified in the following way on a 10-point individualism scale, where 10 = most individualistic and 1 = least individualistic: United States = 10 points, Australia = 9 points, Taiwan = 5 points, and China = 2 points. Second, the subsamples must be sufficiently large to perform latent class analyses. The design of the larger study is described in detail by Suh et al. (1998) .
Materials
The participants were required to complete a questionnaire that contained items for assessing their life satisfaction, experience of emotions, and personality. Chinese and Taiwanese students completed a Mandarin Chinese version of the questionnaire. The English questionnaire was translated into Chinese by a native Chinese-speaking bilingual scientist. A retranslation was performed by a native Chinese-speaking bilingual scientist with a Ph.D. in psychology. The retranslation was compared with the original version by three native English-speaking people and was rated on a 7-point scale (1 = totally incorrect, 7 = completely correct). The retranslation was rated a 6 by two people and a 7 by one person.
One of the questions dealt with the norms for emotions. It read, "In the following question we would like you to indicate how appropriate or desirable it is to experience certain emotions. Please use the following scale to give your answer to each emotion."
1 The following emotions were presented: joy, affection, pride, contentment, anger, fear, sadness, and guilt. The theoretical background for selecting these emotions was described by Diener, Smith, and Fuijta (1995 The frequency of emotions was assessed by the following instruction: "Using the scale below, indicate how often you feel each of the emotions listed below. Put a number from 1 to 7 to accurately reflect how much of the time when you are awake you feel that emotion. How much of the time during the past month have you felt each emotion?" The same list of emotions was given. The participants rated each emotion on a sevencategory response scale ranging from never (1) to always (7).
The intensity of emotions was assessed by the instruction, "Now use the scale below to indicate the intensity of these emotions WHEN YOU DO FEEL THEM. That is, when you do experience this emotion, no matter how rarely, typically how INTENSE is your emotional experience?" The intensity of each emotion from the emotion list described above was rated on a 7-point scale ranging from none-/ never experienced it (1) to extremely intense (7).
Procedure
In the first step, the items measuring norms for affect were analyzed by latent class analysis. The multiculture (multigroup) latent class models were analyzed with the computer program PANMARK. (van de Pol, Langeheine, & de Jong, 1996) . To reduce the cells of the multidimensional contingency table, we used two strategies: First, the three desirable and the three undesirable categories of the norm items were reduced to one category each. Thus, response variables with three categories underlie the latent class analyses. Second, the positive emotions of joy, affection, pride, and contentment were analyzed separately from the negative emotions of anger, fear, sadness, and guilt. The positive and negative emotions were analyzed separately because of past evidence that the two are based on systems that show some degree of independence (e.g., Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999 ).
To analyze the class structure, we first determined, separately for each nation, the common minimal class number for all the participating nations that provided a satisfactory model fit. Then we conducted a multigroup latent class analysis including all nations. We compared several solutions using four different goodness-of-fit criteria: the likelihood ratio test, the Pearson chi-square test, the Cressie-Read test, and the Akaike information criterion (AIC; for a description of these statistics, see Read & Cressie, 1988) . Because of sparse tables, we applied the bootstrapping methodology and used 300 bootstrapping analyses (see Langeheine, Pannekoek, & van de Pol, 1996) . In the case of sparse tables, the p values of the test statistics might not be valid because the assumption that the test statistics are distributed according to a chi-square distribution might be violated. Bootstrapping analysis cures this problem because the distributions of the test statistics can be estimated, and therefore the estimation of the p values is more valid . We report the original p values that were estimated on the basis of the assumption that the test statistics are distributed according to a chi-square distribution. In addition, we also report the bootstrapping p values. However, we interpret only the bootstrapping p values because we have sparse tables. To test the assumption of measurement invariance, we restricted all response probabilities to be equal across nations. We evaluated the fit of the restricted models by four criteria. First, the models should not have been rejected by any of the three tests (likelihood ratio test, Pearson chi-square test, Cressie-Read test) using a bootstrapping alpha of .05. Second, we considered the likelihood ratio difference test. This means that we calculated the differences between the values of the likelihood ratio test of the unrestricted models and the values of the likelihood ratio test of the models with measurement invariance. Because we have sparse tables we applied Holt and Macready's (1989) recommendation and considered likelihood ratio difference tests as significant if the probability value was smaller than .01. Because PANMARK does not provide bootstrapping results for likelihood ratio difference tests, we used traditional p values for these tests. Third, we made the decision even more rigorous by comparing the restricted solutions with the unrestricted ones. If there was any hint that relaxing the strong assumption of total measurement invariance would lead to a more appropriate model, we analyzed a model with relaxed measurement invariance assumptions (partial measurement invariance) and tested this model against the unrestricted one. Fourth, we compared the AIC values of all models considered and chose the model with the lowest AIC value. Hence, we used a very conservative test strategy to ensure that the models we selected represented true cross-cultural consistencies and variations and that we did not overlook substantive cultural differences.
To analyze whether and how the latent classes of respondents differ in their frequency and intensity of experienced emotions, we applied the following strategy. First, all participants were assigned to the latent norm classes for which their assignment probabilities were maximum. Because PANMARK does not calculate the individual assignment probabilities, we used the computer program LEM (Vermunt, 1993) for these analyses. Then, differences between classes and differences between nations were analyzed by analysis of variance and the Kruskal-Wallis test, because the assumption of equal variances between cells was violated in some cases (see below).
Results
Latent Class Analyses of the Norm Items
The goodness-of-fit coefficients for the different latent class models are given in Table 1 . We first consider the unrestricted analyses. The latent class analyses revealed that a five-class structure for positive emotions and a six-class structure for negative emotions showed a good model fit for all nations. In these analyses, no restrictions about the nations were added, which means that the response probabilities can differ between nations. For both positive and negative emotions, a model with perfect measurement invariance (equal response probabilities between all nations) shows appropriate fit coefficients for the positive emotions but is inappropriate for the negative emotions. A detailed inspection of the results revealed that the perfect measurement invariance assumption for all nations might be too strong. Rather, a model in which the measurement invariance hypothesis in one class of the Chinese population was removed was superior to a model with perfect measurement invariance but not significantly worse than the unrestricted model according to the criteria described in the Method section. Because this was also true for positive emotions, we accepted a solution with partial measurement invariance for both types of affect. The model with partial measurement invariance assumes that there is perfect measurement invariance between Australia, Taiwan, and the United States. Furthermore, all classes in the Chinese population, with the exception of one class, showed measurement invariance with the three other nations. However, there was one class for both types of affect that was specific to China.
Positive emotions. Before the results of the positive emotions are presented, we would like to reiterate how our theoretical considerations about cultural differences in self-evaluative emotions are related to our data set. We expected that differences in the cultures should primarily be found for the self-evaluative emotion pride. The collectivistic country, China, should differ notably from both the individualistic countries, the United States and Australia, in such a way that types (latent classes) that are characterized by the undesirability of pride occur more frequently. The prevalence rate of these types in Taiwan should lie between the rate for China and both the other countries, because with regard to the individualism-collectivism variable, Taiwan can be classified between China and the other two countries.
The latent class solution for the positive emotions is illustrated in Table 2 . The rows refer to the five different classes. The first four classes are based on the measurement invariance hypothesis for all the countries, Class 5a is invariant for the United States, Australia, and Taiwan, and Class 5b is specific to China. In the last row, the concentration coefficient is given. We come to this coefficient later. The first four columns contain the response probabilities of the three categories for the four emotions: desirable and appropriate, neutral, and undesirable and inappropriate. For example, the response probabilities for joy in Class 1 indicate that people belonging to this class think (with a probability of 1.00) that joy is desirable and appropriate. For Class 2, the probability is maximum (.74) for the category neutral and smaller for the categories desirable/appropriate (.19) and undesirable/inappropriate (.09). Hence, people belonging to this class can be characterized as people with a neutral attitude to joy. The response probabilities for the other emotions and classes can be interpreted analogously. The last four columns indicate the relative class sizes in the four nations. A class size of .00 means that the class does not exist in a nation as a result of the empirical analysis. The empty cell in Row 5a indicates that the measurement invariance assumption has been relaxed for China and that the probabilities in the Chinese sample were not restricted to be equal to the other nations. The probability of Class 5 in China is presented in a separate row to make sure that Class 5 in China refers to a different response pattern. Therefore, the empty cell in Row 5a indicates that the size of Class 5 in China can be found in another row. Conceptually, a .00
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Note. Concentration (CON; Wickens, 1989) = 1 -sum of the squared probabilities. The minimum concentration in this analysis (five categories of the latent class variable) was zero, and the maximum concentration was .80. AU = Australia; US = the United States; CH = China; TW = Taiwan; D/A = desirable and appropriate; N = neutral; UD/IA = undesirable and inappropriate.
value of .00 and an empty cell mean the same thing, namely that the pattern does not exist in a nation. How can the classes be characterized and how are they distributed across the different nations? Class 1 consists of people who rated all positive emotions as desirable and appropriate because the probability for the category desirable and appropriate is close to 1. Eighty-three percent of the Australian sample and 83% of the American sample belong to this class, but only 9% of the Chinese sample and 32% of the Taiwanese sample do so. Class 2 consists of people who rated all the emotions as neutral. This class is small in all nations, indicating that people have a (positive or negative) attitude toward the pleasant emotions. The sizes of this class are significantly different from zero in China and Taiwan but trivial in the two other nations. Class 3 is characterized by the high desirability of joy and affection. Pride and contentment are also to some extent desirable, yet people belonging to this class are rather indifferent with respect to these emotions. Thirty-two percent of the Chinese sample and 14% of the American sample belong to this class. For the other countries, this class is not of importance. Class 4 differs from Class 3 essentially in that the emotion of pride is explicitly rated as undesirable and inappropriate, whereas contentment tends to be rated rather indifferently. This class is most representative of the Chinese sample, because 34% of that sample can be classified here. Class 5 differs in its response probabilities between China and the three other nations. Class 5a, which is not found in China but is found in all other nations, is characterized by a high desirability of joy, affection, and contentment, whereas pride is rated rather indifferently. This class is prototypical for Taiwan, with more than half of the Taiwanese sample belonging to this class. Class 5a looks very similar to Class 3 in profile, but the two classes differ in the numerical values of the response probabilities, in particular for the category desirable and appropriate. The Chinese-specific class, Class 5b, stands out because all of the assessed emotions are rated as undesirable and inappropriate, with 16% of the Chinese sample thinking that positive emotions are undesirable.
How can these results be interpreted with respect to our theoretical considerations? Concerning the positive emotions, pride is the most relevant. Class 4 can be interpreted as a typical collectivistic pattern in which pride is considered undesirable. After all, one third of the Chinese sample belongs to this group, thus supporting the assumption that collectivistic cultures consider pride more undesirable than do individualistic ones. Class 5a also points in this direction with its indifference with respect to pride. This class is typical for Taiwan, which is currently on its way from being a collectivistic country to being an individualistic country. In general, the analyses confirm that the classes are differentiated principally with respect to pride.
In the last row in Table 2 , the concentration coefficients are given for each nation. The concentration coefficients were calcu-lated on the basis of the class sizes (probabilities of the latent classes). The concentration coefficient is a measure for the variability of probabilities (see Wickens, 1989) . It is zero if one latent class has a probability of 1 and, consequently, all other classes have a probability of zero. It is maximum if all latent classes have the same probabilities. Hence, the larger the concentration is, the larger is the within-nation heterogeneity. The concentration coefficients show that the heterogeneity is very large in China and relatively small in Australia and the United States, with Taiwan in between. This result indicates that the individualistic nations of Australia and the United States are very homogeneous nations with respect to norms for positive emotions, whereas the more collectivistic nations of China and Taiwan are rather heterogeneous.
Negative emotions. Concerning the negative emotions, we expected that in the individualistic nations (the United States and Australia), types of people for whom guilt is undesirable should be found more frequently than in China. On the other hand, types with the opposite tendencies should be found more often in China. The relative frequencies in Taiwan should once again lie between those of the individualistic countries and that of China. No predictions were formulated with respect to the other emotions.
The results of the latent class analyses with respect to anger, fear, sadness, and guilt are shown in Table 3 . Class 1 identifies a group that rates all of the negative emotions as desirable and appropriate. This class is approximately the same size (with a class size of about 22%) for all four nations. Class 2 is characterized by the fact that all four emotions are considered undesirable and inappropriate. This class is the largest in the United States, Australia, and Taiwan, with class sizes between 35% and 44%. This class, however, is comparatively small in China (14%). Thus, there are rather few people in China who think that negative emotions are generally undesirable and inappropriate. In Class 3, the modal response probability for all emotions is the neutral, middle category. This class is larger in both Asiatic countries than in the United States or Australia. In sum, the first three classes represent differences in the level of desirability (i.e., desirable, neutral, undesirable) that are similar for all negative emotions. The remaining classes, however, portray typological differences between specific emotions. In Class 4, guilt is rated as desirable and appropriate, whereas the modal value for anger is undesirable and inappropriate. Furthermore, sadness is considered desirable, whereas fear is undesirable. This class is comparably small in all countries, albeit somewhat larger in China and Taiwan than in the other two countries. Class 5 is characterized by the contrast between fear, which is desirable, and sadness, which is undesirable. It is relatively small in all the countries and is most common in Note. Concentration (CON; Wickens, 1989) = 1 -sura of the squared probabilities. The minimum concentration in this analysis (six categories of the latent class variable) was zero, and the maximum was .83. AU = Australia; US = the United States; CH = China; TW = Taiwan; D/A = desirable and appropriate; N = neutral; UD/IA = undesirable and inappropriate.
China. Finally, Classes 6a and 6b point to a typical pattern for individualistic countries-that is, the undesirability of guilt. There are structural differences between China and the other three countries: Mainly, guilt is less undesirable in China than in the other countries, and sadness is somewhat undesirable in China yet moderately desirable in the other three countries. This class is seldom found in Taiwan, whereas it is relatively common in the other countries. In sum, there are strong national differences in the desirability of guilt. In China, the classes in which the probability of the undesirable category for guilt is close to 1 (Classes 2 and 6a) are comparatively sparsely occupied (14%) or do not exist, whereas 62% of Australians, 57% of Americans, and 47% of Taiwanese belong to these classes.
The concentration coefficients indicate that the national differences in heterogeneity are smaller for negative affect than for positive affect. The concentration coefficients are all rather large, showing that there is strong intranational heterogeneity with respect to norms for negative affect. Again, China is the nation with the largest intranational heterogeneity, with a concentration coefficient that is close to the maximum possible value.
In conclusion, regarding the results for positive and negative affect norms, it can be said that the self-conscious emotions pride and guilt differentiate between the nations most clearly. We return to this result in the Discussion.
Within-Nation Differences Between Classes
To analyze differences in the reported intensity and frequency of experienced emotions, we assigned all participants to the latent classes for which their assignment probabilities were maximum. The mean classification (assignment) probabilities for the different latent classes are given in Table 4 . The mean classification probabilities can be interpreted as reliability coefficients (maximum value = 1.00). High values indicate high reliability. The mean classification probabilities in our study are rather large, showing that a reliable assignment was possible. Next, mean differences in the frequency and intensity of emotions between these classes were analyzed by analysis of variance. Because the assumption of equal variances between cells (tested by the Levene test) was violated in several analyses and because a violation of this assumption, in combination with unequal cell sizes, questions the validity of the F test (Stevens, 1996) , we also tested differences between classes with the Kruskal-Wallis test, a nonparametric statistical test. With this test, differences in the mean ranks between classes were analyzed. We only report the mean values because most readers might be unfamiliar with mean ranks. The mean values, the correlation between norm classes and the frequency and intensity judgments, the F tests, and the KruskalWallis tests for within-nation differences are given in Tables 5, 6 , 7, and 8. If the Levene test indicates that the equal variance assumption is violated, the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test should be interpreted. Moreover, it is important to note that some classes are very small in some nations (see Tables 2 and 3) and that, therefore, the F test should generally be interpreted cautiously. However, as the results show, the F test and the KruskalWallis test led us to the same conclusion with respect to the significance of the results in many cases, showing cross-analyses consistency of the findings.
Positive emotional experience. Between-classes differences in the reported frequency and the intensity of emotions are given for all nations in Tables 5 and 6 . In general, the correlations between the norm classes and the frequency and intensity judgments are low to medium sized when they are evaluated with respect to Cohen's (1988) classification of effect sizes. They are comparably large in Taiwan. The mean differences are significant in most cases, showing that differences in norms are related to differences in emotional experiences. Generally, the mean frequency and intensity values are larger in classes in which these emotions are considered desirable than in classes in which these emotions are considered neutral or undesirable. In particular, in the two collectivistic nations, the frequency and intensity values of pride are rather small in Class 4, in which all positive emotions are considered desirable with the exception of pride and contentment.
Negative emotional experiences. The results concerning the frequency and intensity of negative emotions across latent norm classes are less consistent across nations, and the correlations are also low to medium sized (see Tables 7 and 8 ). When we consider the Kruskal-Wallis test only, 10 out of 32 associations between norms and experience are significant. Moreover, with only one exception, significant associations were only found for the two collectivistic nations. This result shows that norms for positive emotions are more closely linked to emotional experiences than are norms for negative emotions.
Between-Nations Differences Within Classes
In the next step, we analyzed between-nations differences in the reported experience of affect within each of the latent classes. In these analyses, differences between nations in the norms for emotions are controlled. Thus, mean differences in the frequency and intensity of emotions between nations do not reflect differences in the desirability of emotions. The most interesting question regarding these analyses is whether individuals who do not differ in their attitudes toward emotions between nations do differ in the intensity and frequency of their emotions. The results of these analyses are given in Tables 9, 10 , 11, and 12. The mean values on which these analyses are based are the mean values reported in Tables  5-8 . Again, we only focus on the most interesting results.
Positive emotional experiences. Significant international differences were found for all classes, with the exception of Class 5a and Class 5b. Class 5a exists only in Australia and Taiwan, and within this class the two nations are not different. Class 5b could not be compared between nations because it exists only in China. The first interesting result concerning the frequency and intensity of positive emotions is that China has, in all classes with exception of Class 2 and for all positive emotions, the lowest mean value (see Tables 5 and 6 ). This shows that China is the nation with the lowest frequency and intensity of positive emotions even if we correct for national differences in the desirability of emotions. The mean values of the other nations depend on the latent classes. In general, Australia, Taiwan, and the United States are quite similar, with the exception of the frequency and intensity of pride in Class 4, the class in which pride is undesirable. In this class, the mean values of the frequency and intensity of pride are lower in Taiwan than in Australia and the United States. This is in line with the role pride plays in more collectivistic countries. Negative emotional experiences. The results for the negative emotions are given in Tables 11 and 12 . For the negative emotions, the national differences are rather strong for anger, and the differences are stronger for the intensity than for the frequency judgments. For the intensity judgements, the international differences are rather strong in Class 2, in which all negative emotions are considered undesirable, in Class 4, in which only sadness and guilt are desirable, and in Class 5, in which anger and fear are desirable but sadness and guilt are not. In general, China has the lowest mean values in the majority of classes. This result implies that, controlling for norms for negative affect, the Chinese report less frequent and less intense unpleasant emotions. Considering the frequency of the negative emotions, Taiwan is similar to Australia and the United States, but with respect to the intensity of negative emotions, there are stronger differences between Taiwan and the two individualistic countries. Hence, there is a tendency for people in the more individualistic countries of Australia and the United States to feel negative emotions more intensely than do people in the more collectivistic countries of China and Taiwan.
Discussion
The analyses reveal a number of interesting insights into the structure of norms for emotions and the cross-cultural generalizability of this structure. We discuss the results in five areas: (a) the structure of norms for emotions, (b) intranational variability in norms for affect, (c) norms and emotional experiences, (d) between-nations differences in emotional experience, and (e) the use of latent class analysis in cross-cultural studies on emotions.
The Structure of Norms for Emotions
Considering the results of the norms for positive and negative emotions together, the main differences between nations can be Note. Reported are the mean values (possible range = 1 to 7). Empty columns indicate that the class does not exist in a culture, r represents the correlation between the class variable and the dependent variable (calculated by the square root of if). The chi-square test we used was the Kruskal-Wallis test. The sample size for the chi-squares can be computed using the degrees of freedom of the F tests: N = d^ + df 2 + 1. L = Levene test of equal error variances (asterisks indicate the significance of violations of the homogeneity assumption). *p < .05. **p < .01.
found in pride and guilt. In more collectivistic cultures guilt is more important, whereas in individualistic cultures pride is of greater relevance. Hence, the results confirm our theoretical predictions that the group of emotions that are often prone to crosscultural differences is the self-conscious or self-reflective emotions-emotions that reflect on the individual's own actions (see Tangney & Fischer, 1995) . The approach-oriented, individualistic cultures think that self-reflective emotions about a person doing well are good, whereas the collectivistic, Confucian cultures in the Pacific Rim believe that self-reflective emotions that indicate that one's controllable actions are wrong or insufficient are desirable. This is in line with cultural differences in regulatory focus. For cultures that are promotion focused, pride is more important, whereas for cultures that are prevention focused, guilt is more desirable.
Generally, the results show that not all "positive" emotions are considered positive (i.e., desirable, appropriate) by most individuals. Furthermore, not all "negative" emotions are considered negative (i.e., undesirable, inappropriate) by most individuals. This finding has consequences for the concept of social desirability. In studies scrutinizing whether affect judgments are biased by a social desirability response style, it is typically assumed that positive emotions are considered desirable and negative emotions are considered undesirable. However, this basic assumption seems to be wrong. A stronger test for the assumption that affect judgments are (not) distorted by social desirability would be to take into account group differences in the desirability of emotions and analyze the influence of desirability judgments on affect judgments in different subgroups.
Intranational Variability in Norms for Affect
The nations in this study do not have one set of norms to which everyone adheres. Instead, the countries include people with a variety of views about the normativeness of emotions. The nations on average differ, but this disguises the fact that there is substantial variability in norms within the societies. Culture seems to influence the number of people adhering to a particular viewpoint, but the cultures are nevertheless heterogeneous enough that there are differences within them. Thus, cross-cultural researchers need to consider not only average cultural differences but also the variability within cultures.
These within-nation differences can be explained by two concepts of cross-cultural psychology: first, the distinction between idiocentrism and allocentrism, and, second, the distinction between tight versus loose cultures (e.g., Triandis, 1989) . The concepts of idiocentrism and allocentrism reflect the distinction between individualism and collectivism and are concepts we can use to char- 
Note. Reported are the mean values (possible range = 1 to 7). Empty columns indicate that the class does not exist in a culture, r represents the correlation between the class variable and the dependent variable (calculated by the square root of TJ 2 ). The chi-square test we used was the Kruskal-Wallis test. The sample size for the chi-squares can be computed using the degrees of freedom of the F tests: N = dfi + df 2 + 1. L = Levene test of equal error variances (asterisks indicate the significance of violations of the homogeneity assumption). *p < .05. **p < .01. acterize nations on the individual level. Thus, within individualistic and collectivistic nations there can be idiocentric and allocentric individuals. However, in individualistic nations there should be more idiocentric individuals, and in collectivistic countries there should be more allocentric individuals. The latent class analyses revealed that most people of the two individualistic countries show an idiocentric norm pattern: In the two more collectivistic nations, both idiocentric and allocentric patterns can be found, although most of the people belong to the more allocentric patterns.
Nations differ not only in their collectivism and individualism but also in how loose or tight they are. Tight cultures are very homogeneous with respect to norms. In tight cultures, there is a high pressure on all individuals of a society to follow these norms. Loose cultures do not have such strong norms and tolerate more deviations. The concentration coefficient might be regarded as a measure of the tightness versus looseness of a nation regarding the variables under study. According to this coefficient, Australia and the United States are relatively tight nations with respect to norms for positive affect. In these nations, there might be pressure on individuals to be joyful, happy, and full of love and pride and to make use of their constitutional right to the pursuit of happiness. Deviations from this norm of happiness might have a strong impact, and being unhappy might be regarded as failing. People who are less happy are expected to correct their unhappiness by using, for instance, psychotherapy. It was unexpected that the individualistic nations are the most uniform with regard to pleasant affect norms. Although these nations are "loose" in terms of the norms for behavior, at the level of emotions they appear not to be loose. Rather, the desirability of happiness seems to be prescribed by the culture. Indeed, one justification for people "doing thenown thing" is that everyone ought to be happy and, therefore, follow their own desires. Thus, allowing for more variability in individual behavior seems, ironically, to require a strong norm about the desirability of positive experiences.
The two more collectivistic nations seem to be looser countries with respect to norms for positive emotions. In particular, China, which was characterized as "a collectivistic, but 'relatively' loose country" by Triandis (1989, p. 511) , shows a large variety in norm types. In China, people who are unhappy might also be accepted, because in China there are also individuals who think that positive emotions are undesirable. Pride is considered undesirable by a large number of people in the two more collectivistic countries, but there are still many people who think that feeling pride is acceptable. Thus, the norms for positive emotions (e.g., not to feel pride) seem not to be so strong that all individuals must follow them. This might be a sign that there is a movement to more diversity in these countries. For norms for negative emotions, the intranational va- 
Note. Reported are the mean values (possible range = 1 to 7). Empty columns indicate that the class does not exist in a culture, r represents the correlation between the class variable and the dependent variable (calculated by the square root of TJ 2 ). The chi-square test we used was the Kruskal-Wallis test. The sample size for the chi-squares can be computed using the degrees of freedom of the F tests: N = rff, + df 2 + 1. L = Levene test of equal error variances (asterisks indicate the significance of violations of the homogeneity assumption). *p < .05. **p < .01. riety differs less strongly between nations. All nations are relatively heterogeneous in their norms for experiencing unpleasant emotions, but China is nevertheless the most heterogeneous. From a methodological point of view, the results show that latent class analysis is an appropriate methodology to discover international differences in the tightness versus looseness of nations.
Norms and Emotional Experiences
In terms of emotional experiences, we found that there are lowto medium-sized correlations between norm classes and emotional experiences. For positive emotions, we found a consistent pattern such that the frequency and intensity of positive emotions are related to the norm classes in such a way that higher desirability goes along with respondents reporting more experience of this emotion. For negative affect, however, the results were much more inconsistent. We discuss the results for both types of affect separately. However, it should be noted that the variegated pattern of findings suggests that people do not automatically infer norms from their own emotional experiences.
For positive emotions, significant associations with respect to the frequency of emotions were predominantly found for pride and contentment. This is in line with the latent structure of the norm data because the classes differ mainly between the desirability of pride and contentment. The association between the desirability and frequency of positive emotions might point to the influence of emotion regulation. People who think that a positive emotion is desirable might seek that emotion more strongly than other people. On the other hand, if a person thinks, for example, that pride is undesirable, that person will avoid situations in which this emotion occurs. If those situations cannot be avoided, the person will appraise the situation in such a way that pride will not arise; if this is not possible, it is likely that the person will regulate this feeling downward. Hence, the association between the frequency of positive affect and norms for these emotions suggests that regulative behavior is effective. However, although individuals can and do seek such situations, no situation is perfectly under the control of individuals, and therefore the associations might not be very strong.
The associations between norm classes and emotional experiences, in particular emotion intensity, might also suggest the importance of socialization influences. If individuals have learned that specific emotions are desirable, they are free to feel these emotions intensely. However, if they have learned that specific emotions are undesirable or inappropriate, they might have learned to regulate this feeling downward.
Why are the results so different for negative emotions? One interesting result is that not only people who think that negative emotions are desirable but also people who think that negative Note. Reported are the mean values (possible range = 1 to 7). Empty columns indicate that the class does not exist in a culture, r represents the correlation between the class variable and the dependent variable (calculated by the square root of TJ 2 ). The chi-square test we used was the Kruskal-Wallis test. The sample size for the chi-squares can be computed using the degrees of freedom of the F tests: N = df l + df 2 + 1. L = Levene test of equal error variances (asterisks indicate the significance of violations of the homogeneity assumption). * p < .05. ** p < .01.
emotions are undesirable feel them (moderately) frequently and intensely. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that there might be two groups of people. One group of people may often experience negative emotions because, for them, negative emotions have a positive function, indicating that something is going wrong. These people might be able to use this indicator of negative emotions to cope with the situations that elicit these emotions. Additionally, there might be another group of people who frequently experience these emotions but are not able to regulate them-these people might be stuck with the emotions without making use of their function. These people might be genetically predisposed to negative affect and therefore experience it more often and believe that it is not appropriate because they find it to be aversive. These assumptions would predict that interindividual differences in norms might be only weakly related to interindividual differences in emotional experiences. These assumptions, however, are speculative, and they indicate that the linkage between emotional norms and emotional experiences might be rather complex. However, this subject seems to be a very fascinating topic of future cross-cultural studies on emotions.
Between-Nations Differences in Emotional Experience
There appear to be differences in the experience of emotions across nations even when norms are held constant. Thus, it appears that factors such as genetics or life circumstances also influence emotional experiences beyond the influence of norms.
The most important result here is the finding that China consistently shows the lowest experiences in almost all norm classes. People in China also have the lowest frequency and intensity scores of both positive and negative affects. This result can be explained by the general value emotions have in China (for an overview, see Russell & Yik, 1996) . Several authors, such as Klineberg (1938) , Potter (1988) , and Wu (1982) , have pointed out Note. Reported are the mean values (possible range = 1 to 7). Empty columns indicate that the class does not exist in a culture, r represents the correlation between the class variable and the dependent variable (calculated by the square root of if). The chi-square test we used was the Kruskal-Wallis test. The sample size for the chi-squares can be computed using the degrees of freedom of the F tests :N = df l + df 2 + 1. L = Levene test of equal error variances (asterisks indicate the significance of violations of the homogeneity assumption). *p<.05. **p<.01. a general attitude to consider emotions as )r illness causing. Moreover, the moderation or suppression of emotions is generally highly valued in Chin;i. In
Latent i Studies
Class Analysu on Emotions ; in Cross-Cultural
The analyses show that latent class analysis is a helpful methodology to explore and test typological structures of emotion. With particular, the value of a moderated emotional life might explain the relatively low scores of the Chinese even in the classes in which the emotions are considered desirable. An alternative explanation is that there are genetical differences in the physiology of emotional responses between different countries.
Another interesting result is that Taiwan is very similar to Australia and the United States with respect to almost all positive emotions, with the exception of pride. Regarding pride, Taiwan is Note. Reported are the mean values (possible range = 1 to 7). Empty columns indicate that the class does not exist in a culture, r represents the correlation between the class variable and the dependent variable (calculated by the square root of if). The chi-square test we used was the Kruskal-Wallis test. The sample size for the chi-squares can be computed using the degrees of freedom of the F tests: N = df + df 2 + l.L = Levene test of equal error variances (asterisks indicate the significance of violations of the homogeneity assumption). * p < .05. **p < .01. EED AND DIENER latent class analysis, it is possible to consider (a) categorical response variables, (b) intra-and international differences in individual profiles, and (c) universal and culture-specific norm types. Furthermore, it is possible to test the equivalence of structures across cultures in a strong way. The results reveal that the strong assumption of measurement invariance had to be rejected for the total sample but that there are subgroups of individuals that are equivalent across nations and subgroups that are culture specific. Comparing the nations by one statistic (e.g., the mean value), as is often done, obscures this cultural variety and complexity.
A model with universal and culture-specific norm classes fits the data very well. This clearly shows that there is structural equivalence and structural diversity between nations. It also demonstrates the advantage of latent class analysis in separating universal from culture-specific emotion patterns that go beyond "traditional" methods of cross-cultural psychology. Furthermore, the latent classes revealed that there are different typologies of norms. In particular, for negative emotions we found quite different norm patterns. One interesting result, for example, is that the desirability of anger contrasts sharply with the desirability of guilt. In classes in which anger is desirable, guilt is always undesirable, and in classes in which anger is undesirable, guilt is always desirable. A further interesting result is that there are classes in which all positive emotions are considered undesirable and all negative emotions are considered desirable. These different norm patterns demonstrate that a typological approach is superior to and more informative than a dimensional approach.
In the study of norms for emotions presented in this article, generalized norms for affect were analyzed. In future studies, it might be interesting to use latent class analysis for exploring the structure of situation-specific feeling rules and to scrutinize how strongly norms of emotions generalize across situations. Moreover, it might be useful to include more nations differing in individualism and collectivism.
